The debate about "critical minerals" has ceased to be a concern of the mining industry alone. It is now on the agenda in fields ranging from energy security to reindustrialization and geopolitics. In 2025 this trend emerged more clearly: governments and industrial production chains sought to reduce their vulnerabilities, diversify their suppliers, and shorten technological routes — especially for copper, nickel, lithium, graphite, and rare earths. Brazil, thanks to its strong geological base, its comparatively clean electric power matrix, and its extensive mining experience, stands at the center of this conversation.
Brazil presents a set of attributes that few countries can match. We possess consolidated mineral provinces, a skilled workforce, ample installed capacity in both mining and metallurgy, and a history of large-scale operations. A further structural advantage, frequently underappreciated, is Brazil’s electric power matrix, which, with its high share of renewable sources, offers a competitive basis for reducing the carbon footprint of mineral and metallurgical supply chains — an increasingly important requirement in corporate procurement, financing, and all policies on which climate concerns have a bearing.
In 2025, the political message also became more objective: Brazil signaled its intention to attract capital and, above all, to promote value-added and industrial supply chains, in line with the global competition for strategic minerals. The logic is correct: exporting only “tons” will not capture the technological income of the 21st century; exporting materials, intermediate products and, when possible, industrial components increases resilience and income. We do not want to repeat what we have already experienced with silicon, but rather repeat the success of what was achieved, for example, with niobium. Why not also take advantage of the country's vast uranium reserves?
An important milestone in this context was the government’s effort to induce investments in the transformation and industrialization of strategic minerals. The call launched by Finep/BNDES in 2025 specified a budget and financial instruments (credit, equity, and non-reimbursable funds) aimed at productive capacity and R&D. And the industry responded: the call for proposals received 124 submissions totaling R$ 85.2 billion in potential investments, with the main emphasis on rare earth elements, lithium, copper, and graphite. Subsequently, 56 business plans were selected for the next phase, totaling R$ 45.8 billion. For the investor, this is a sign of connectivity, business appetite, and — above all — an attempt to bring government policy and the mining industry into alignment with one another.
Another indicator of repositioning came from external interest in Brazilian assets linked to the energy transition. In 2025, for example, there was international emphasis on U.S. financial support for the expansion of the Serra Verde rare earth mine, with the explicit aim of diversifying the chain away from China — and with the promise of increased supplies in the future. Regardless of the merits of each case, the message is unequivocal: a Brazilian project can become a link in a sensitive global supply chain, on the condition that it delivers volume, quality, compliance with the specifications, and contractual reliability.
The “cons”: predictability, licensing, infrastructure, and capital cost
While Brazil is strong on geology, it still needs to be strong on “executability”. The risk most cited by investors is not discovering less ore: it is discovering more uncertainty. For greenfield and brownfield projects, regulatory predictability and licensing delays are variables as important as ore grade and tonnage.
In the regulatory field, 2025 was also marked by institutional and normative adjustments. The National Mining Agency (ANM) adopted a new internal rulebook in 2025, aimed at administrative reorganization and more clearly defined areas of responsibility. And the country continued to discuss the updating of general standards (NRM) in a public consultation, focusing on technical requirements, mining plans, environmental control, safety, and records — essential issues to reduce accidents and increase operational governance. For the investor, this can be positive; the challenge is that regulatory modernization needs to be accompanied by implementation capability, digitization, and interpretative stability so as not to become an additional layer of time and expense.
There are also the classic bottlenecks: logistics in remote regions, variability of energy costs at some locations, land tenure obstacles, litigation, and social risks. In the energy transition, the “social license” has ceased to be mere rhetoric and has become a financial condition. Projects that do not incorporate, from the outset, governance, community relations, traceability, and environmental management tend to be more expensive — or simply fail to go ahead.
The “real potential” of the energy transition in Brazil
Brazil will not become a protagonist simply by proclaiming itself a protagonist: it will do so by delivering projects. And “delivering” means three things: (1) technical quality in the discovery and surveying of mineral resources; (2) predictability in licensing; and (3) financing and construction with schedules and costs both under strict control.
We have all the necessary skills in the private sector to address the challenges related to advancing research and development projects for mineral assets.
In the news from the mining industry in 2025, “critical minerals” gained further space on the Brazilian agenda and were incorporated into policies and strategic signals, with the mention of lithium, rare earths, and copper, among others. This is important because it reduces the “narrative risk”: when the State recognizes that an issue has become critical, it becomes more feasible to build financing instruments, innovation, and productive linkages.
But it is essential to calibrate expectations. Brazil can participate in relevant global energy transition chains, with the advantage of being a reliable and less carbon-intensive supplier — though this does not eliminate the need to compete with jurisdictions where licensing is quicker, where infrastructure is already in place, and capital markets are deeper. Brazil needs to offer a differential in terms of productivity, scale, true environmental, social, and governance (ESG) priorities, and, above all, time.
*President of ADIMB - Brazilian Mining Industry Development and Innovation Agency