Brazil is internationally recognized as a mineral powerhouse. We are one of the world's largest iron ore producers. In addition, the country stands out in the production of copper, gold, manganese, nickel, and many other minerals that are strategic for maintaining a modern economy. Among these resources, one deserves special attention, due to the unique moment it is now experiencing. That resource is uranium.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Brazilian state played a significant role in the prospecting and discovery of uranium, the basic input for generating nuclear power. Surveys from that period classified Brazil as one of the ten largest uranium ore bases in the world. However, while other countries advanced in the exploration of this potential, the Brazilian nuclear program stagnated.
Despite being one of the ten countries in the world that possess the technology for the entire nuclear fuel cycle — from mining, through enrichment and the manufacture of fuel elements — our nuclear program was restricted to two operational reactors: Angra 1 and Angra 2. The construction of Angra 3, begun in the 1980s, to this day remains unfinished.
This paralysis had direct consequences for uranium mining in Brazil. The low cost of fuel in nuclear power generation — amounting to no more than 20 percent of the total operating cost, as opposed to fossil fuels, which can reach up to 90 percent — meant that the ore resources discovered in earlier decades were deemed sufficient to meet domestic demand, thus putting an end to the prospecting cycle.
With only two reactors operating, Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB), a federally-owned company that holds the monopoly on uranium mining and nuclear fuel production, focused exclusively on producing the fuel elements needed for its single client, Eletronuclear.
There was no economic or political incentive to expand mineral exploration or increase production capacity. The focus remained on meeting existing domestic demand, with no prospects for significant growth.
For decades on end, the international uranium market also lacked the dynamism to justify investments in new prospecting. Prices remained at low levels, reflecting oversupply and stagnant demand. In this context, INB's conservative stance made sense from both an economic and an operational standpoint.
Since then, however, the global energy balance has changed radically. Climate change and the strengthening of the energy transition agenda have led to a resurgence of nuclear power generation worldwide. Countries that had abandoned or reduced their nuclear programs after the Fukushima accident in 2011 are once again viewing nuclear power as an essential component of their decarbonized energy matrices.
France, historically dependent on nuclear energy, has announced the construction of new reactors. The United Kingdom has approved nuclear projects to replace old plants. China leads the global expansion, with more than 30 reactors under construction. Even Japan and Germany, countries that had promised to abandon nuclear energy, have reassessed their positions in the face of the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine and the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
In addition to the resumption of traditional nuclear programs, new technologies are under accelerated development. Small modular reactors (SMRs), micro and small reactors promise to revolutionize the industry by offering safe, flexible, and economically viable solutions for generating electric power. These new models are especially suitable for remote regions, industrial facilities, and even for use in mining operations that require a constant energy supply in isolated locations.
A further push in the same direction is coming from a very recent development: the exponential increase in demand for electricity driven by the spread of artificial intelligence. Data centers that process AI algorithms consume massive amounts of energy. Technology companies such as Google, Microsoft, and Amazon have already announced partnerships with nuclear developers to ensure a stable supply of clean and reliable energy. Microsoft, for example, signed an agreement to reactivate part of the Three Mile Island plant in the United States, exclusively to power its data centers.
Unlike the expectations that were widely entertained twenty years ago, it has now clearly emerged that renewable energies, on their own, face serious limitations on their ability to wholly replace fossil fuels in the short term. The intermittency of solar and wind generation — which depend on weather conditions — and the technical and economic challenges of large-scale energy storage underline the need for baseload power sources, such as nuclear, to ensure energy security and continuity of supply.
All these changed conditions have exerted a direct impact on the uranium market. Demand has been consistently increasing, forcing prices up. According to the World Nuclear Association's World Nuclear Fuel Report 2025, a scenario is projected in which, as new reactors are brought on stream in the next five years, global uranium output will be insufficient to meet demand.
Worldwide uranium concentrate output currently stands at around 60,000 tons a year. Production is concentrated in just a handful of countries: Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia, Namibia, and Russia jointly account for more than half of the global supply. Dependence on geographically concentrated suppliers represents a significant geopolitical risk, especially in a context of increasing international tensions. The war in Ukraine demonstrated the vulnerability of supply chains when they depend on unstable regions or countries with conflicting strategic interests.
It is in this context that Brazil has the potential to take a strategic leading role and position itself as a reliable supplier in a rapidly expanding market.
With its wealth of ore resources, Brazil has a chance of becoming an important player in uranium production. Unlike other critical minerals — such as rare earths, lithium, and nickel — Brazil already masters all the technology necessary to convert the ore into nuclear fuel, adding significant value to the supply chain.
This competitive advantage is unique and strategic. Few countries in the world master the complete nuclear fuel cycle. This means that, in addition to uranium concentrate (yellowcake), Brazil also has the ability to supply enriched uranium, greatly enhancing the value-added of its export product.
INB has the opportunity to find a new path to growth, becoming a crucial supplier of uranium to nations that have expanding nuclear power grids and that maintain consolidated trade relations with Brazil.
Recognizing this opportunity, in 2024 INB launched the Pro-Uranium initiative, which aims to increase Brazil's uranium ore output by encouraging the exploration of new deposits. In December 2025 the National Development Bank (BNDES) opened a market consultation to structure the expansion of INB's uranium production, for an investment provisionally budgeted at R$ 3 billion. The goal is to expand both our known reserves and our output.
This amount would be sufficient not only to guarantee the supply of fuel to the two domestic nuclear power plants but also, no less importantly, to position Brazil as a significant supplier to the world market.
For Brazil to seize this opportunity, however, it will first be necessary to develop and build solid foundations for strategic partnerships between INB and private-sector companies willing to invest capital and assume the risks of prospecting. Uranium, despite being abundant, presents significant complexities involved in its extraction and processing.
Brazil's uranium deposits are geographically dispersed, with varying degrees of mineral concentration and geological characteristics. Some well-known areas, such as the Caetité reserve in Bahia, which houses the country's only active uranium mine, have relatively low grades compared to deposits in other countries. This requires specific processing technologies and pushes up extraction costs, especially in the present market conditions of volatile world prices.
Opening the industry to private enterprise, while maintaining the necessary safeguards and strategic state control, will be a fundamental step. Public-private partnership (PPP) models or regulated concessions could accelerate the prospecting and development of new deposits, bringing capital, technology, and management expertise from the private sector, while the state would maintain control over the strategic resource and ensure compliance with international treaties.
To enable this expansion to occur, Brazil will need to define clear rules, set percentages of government ownership, ensure objectivity in environmental licensing, guarantee full technical rigor, and create risk-sharing mechanisms between the public and private sectors.
Countries such as Canada and Australia, world leaders in uranium production, have developed successful models of coexistence between state-owned and private-sector companies in the sector, maintaining strict safety controls and complying with international safeguards. Brazil can learn from these experiences and adapt solutions to meet its institutional and legal reality.
The time to resume prospecting is now. The projected deficit between uranium supply and demand in the coming years creates a unique window of opportunity. Investments in prospecting and mine development take ten to fifteen years to begin yielding commercial results. This means that the decisions made today will determine whether Brazil will be positioned to earn from this emerging market in the next decade.
It is time to act and take advantage of the competitive edge built over decades of investment in research, technological development, and the training of specialized human resources. More than that, it is time to diversify Brazil's export portfolio, create skilled jobs, and consolidate the country as a powerhouse in the global energy sector.
